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This paper examines how efficiency dynamics of Islamic and conventional banks compare 
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are similar. A non-parametric framework (classification trees) identifies a varying degree of 
alignment between the Islamic and conventional banking model across countries, which 
could explain the plurality in conclusions in the Islamic/conventional bank efficiency debate. 
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Banking efficiency studies have long been of interest to a variety of stakeholders.1 At a macro 
level, there is some evidence that economic growth (as measured by growth in GDP) is 
significantly and positively related to banking sector efficiency (Abedifar et al., 2016; Berger 
et al., 2004; Hasan et al., 2009). At a micro level, efficiency studies can provide 
benchmarking information that will be of interest to bank managers and policy makers in 
order to improve banks’ performance. 
Banking efficiency has also been widely studied in comparative banking analyses, notably 
when comparing Islamic and conventional banks; see Johnes et al., (2014) for a 
comprehensive review of empirical studies on efficiency of these two bank types. Measuring 
efficiency in Islamic banking is particularly important in countries where this type of banking 
accounts for a substantial part of the financial sector. The cases of Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia, where the share of Islamic banking assets are 51.2% and 21.3%, respectively, are 
important examples (Ernst & Young, 2016). In addition, the efficiency of operations of 
Islamic banks that co-exist with their conventional counterparts has a significant positive 
effect on the development of a country’s entire banking sector (Gheeraert, 2014). 
A number of studies comparing the efficiency of the Islamic and conventional banking 
sectors have identified a significant efficiency gap between the two bank types at given points 
in time and for a variety of countries (Abdul-Majid et al., 2010; Al-Muharrami, 2008; Johnes 
et al., 2014; Kamarudin et al., 2014; Srairi, 2010). Given the observed differences between 
the Islamic and conventional banking business models, the variations in efficiency dynamics 
are perhaps to be expected. However, the underlying dynamics of this efficiency have barely 
been examined. Examining banking efficiency and related dynamics warrants an 
investigation as it is closely related to bank risk-taking and capitalisation (Kwan and 
Eisenbies, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2007). Furthermore, the ever-increasing competition in the 
financial services industry (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) places efficiency at the forefront of bank 
managers, regulators and policy makers’ agendas. In light of the importance of efficiency 
measurement and related dynamics, this paper addresses three questions regarding the Islamic 
and conventional banking business models. First, do Islamic and conventional banks have 
different steady state efficiency levels? Second, do Islamic and conventional banks have 
different rates / dynamics of efficiency convergence? Third, are Islamic and conventional 
banks more aligned in certain countries with respect to efficiency dynamics, and if so what 
are the drivers of this behaviour? 
We address the above questions using various approaches and techniques. First, we use a 
stochastic frontier output distance function (ODF) to provide estimates of efficiency. Second, 
a conditional 𝛽-convergence model with Islamic bank shift and slope dummies is estimated 
using pooled OLS, random effects (RE) and system-GMM. A random parameter model 
                                                            
1 The number of citations to the seminal papers by Aigner et al., (1977) and Charnes et al., (1978) on stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) jointly equal around 40,000, while the number of 
citations to Berger and Humphrey, (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997), the two seminal reviews on banking 
efficiency, are around to 4,200 and 2,600 respectively. 
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(RPM) that allows for both the steady state efficiency and the 𝛽-coefficient to vary by bank is 
also used. These estimation techniques allow for an increasing degree of heterogeneity in the 
convergence process across years, countries and bank types, while mitigating potential 
endogeneity concerns. 
Third, we utilise a classification trees approach that offers a way to identify whether there are 
groups of banking systems which are similar in terms of steady state efficiency and efficiency 
convergence rate. This approach, novel in this context, is necessary for the following reasons. 
The fact that the substantial literature on the comparative efficiency of Islamic and 
conventional banks has reached no consensus on which of the two banking systems is 
consistently more (or less) efficient provides prima facie evidence that the conclusion is 
largely country and/or year and/or bank specific. The models employed in the earlier step, 
which are consistent with this relevant literature, are hindered by the vanishing degrees of 
freedom when trying to control for all such factors at once. Moreover, the small number of 
Islamic banks in any given country further complicates any attempt to fully capture 
heterogeneity. This casts doubts on the standard practice in the literature of sampling across 
countries. 
Fourth, we use the classification tree results, panel logit models and a wide array of financial 
structure, macroeconomic, market structure and bank-level characteristics to explain the 
drivers of the (mis-) alignment of the two banking systems across countries. 
Evidence of differences in both efficiency steady states and convergence rates would support 
the hypothesis that Islamic banks operate a different banking business model. On the other 
hand, the absence of a significant difference can be taken as an indicator of mimicking 
behaviour and would favour the hypothesis that the two banking models differ only 
theoretically and not in practice. Our main findings are as follows. On average, the traditional 
𝛽-convergence model finds no significant differences in steady state efficiency and efficiency 
convergence rates of the two bank types. Thus, Islamic banking practices (at an international 
level) are not sufficiently different from conventional ones to affect long-run efficiency or 
convergence, although at various points in time – e.g., episodes of financial distress – short-
run efficiency deviations may exist. Examination of differences in convergence rates by 
country suggests that convergence is significantly different between the two bank types in 
certain countries.  
The classification trees analysis further reveals that steady state efficiencies and convergence 
rates vary both by bank type and by country in certain cases. For example, Islamic and 
conventional banking in Malaysia are indistinguishable in terms of steady state efficiency and 
convergence rates, whereas differences between the two banking systems are more evident in 
some of the Middle East countries. The cross-country alignment of the two banking systems 
is positively related to financial depth, transparency in business, stability in the economic 
environment and concentration. Aligned banking systems are associated with diversified 
income sources, higher liquidity, profitability and financial stability. 
Our paper offers four main contributions. We provide the first formal approach that goes 
beyond a simple efficiency analysis by comparing efficiency dynamics (i.e., steady states and 
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convergence rates) between Islamic and conventional banks. Second, we use a random 
parameter model, which is novel in this context and allows for increased heterogeneity in the 
efficiency steady states and convergence rates across banks. Third, we provide a country 
classification of the two bank types by steady state efficiency and efficiency convergence. 
This is important as it groups the countries where the two banking systems are more aligned. 
Thereby we provide novel results that bring further insights regarding the differences 
between the two banking business models and underlying corporate structure. Furthermore, 
our findings tally with the recent trend in the literature suggesting that the practices of the two 
bank types are converging (Olson and Zoubi, 2017). Fourth, and to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to highlight the drivers behind the (mis-)alignment of 
Islamic and conventional banks from a cross country perspective. 
In summary, our analysis extends the conventional paradigm adopted by most studies and 
which focuses on explaining the differences between the two banks types based on the 
business model and focuses instead on highlighting the role of country specific economic and 
financial indicators as drivers to such differences. Moreover, we also outline that differences 
with respect to efficiency and convergence are only significant in the short-run and that the 
two systems are pretty much aligned in the long-run.  As such our results are important from 
both an operational and a regulatory perspectives. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information, reviews the relevant literature and presents the theoretical framework. The 
methodological approaches employed to address our stated questions are presented in section 
3, while the data are presented in section 4. Results and discussion are presented in section 5. 
Finally, we draw conclusions and policy implications in section 6. 
2. Background information, related literature and theoretical framework 
2.1. Background information 
Islamic banking refers to practices that are commensurate with Shariah, where commonly 
acknowledged prohibitions include: debt interest payment, complex derivative products, 
short-selling, gambling, and dealing with alcohol and tobacco. Islamic finance engages with 
equity-based services (Mudarabah) in which an investor and an entrepreneur enter into a 
joint profit-sharing venture. Murabahah is a cost-plus-profit sale. With Ijarah, a bank leases 
an asset charging set fees. Among a variety of general features that investigations purport to 
show, are that Islamic banks: are more profitable (Hasan and Dridi, 2011), feature superior 
asset quality and capitalisation (Beck et al., 2013b); share a similar risk profile with their 
conventional counterparts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Baele et al., 2014; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Pappas et al., 2017); and exhibit higher technical efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014).2 That is not 
to say that Islamic banks are not subject to economic shocks, but the claim is that these are 
more muted (Di et al., 2017; Olson and Zoubi, 2017). 
                                                            
2 We direct you to Abedifar et al., (2015), Alzahrani and Megginson (2017), Kabir Hassan and Aliyu (2017) for 
some interesting surveys of Islamic banking literature. 
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It is argued that the distinct Islamic profile enhances diversification opportunities for 
investors, see for example Sorwar et al., (2016), Alexakis et al., (2017b) and Akhtar et al., 
(2017). Conversely, some Islamic stocks may be adversely affected by religious restrictions 
on stock trading (Alhomaidi and Kabir Hassan, 2017). Moreover, Islamic banks are 
particularly engaged with the development and economic welfare within low income 
countries (Abedifar et al., 2016). In part, this may be explained by their relatively higher 
liquidity creation (Berger et al., 2017).3 
In terms of corporate governance, Islamic banks typically maintain a Shariah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) which, working alongside a Board of Directors, is considered the “Supra 
Authority” (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). Related research finds that a large SSB is 
associated with enhanced financial performance (Farag et al., 2017; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015) and acts as a protective cushion against risk (Mollah et al., 2017a, 2017b; Pappas et al., 
2017; Uddin et al., 2017). However, the dual board structure of Islamic banks is also known 
to impair their cost efficiency (Uddin et al., 2017). 
2.2. Related literature 
Studies of banking efficiency fall into two general categories. The first comprises studies 
which estimate banking sector efficiency at specific points in time, and possibly also 
examine, in a second stage, the determinants of efficiency. The second category contains 
studies which examine the existence and speed of efficiency convergence, and hence are 
more focused on the dynamics underlying efficiency convergence. We consider each of these 
in turn. 
A vast literature is devoted to the measurement of banking efficiency with early reviews 
including Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), Brown and Skully 
(2002), Casu et al., (2004), while a more recent synthesis can be found in Fethi and Pasiouras 
(2010). A growing literature that compares the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks 
provides only mixed evidence regarding the efficiency of the two bank types. Some of these 
studies find no significant difference between the two bank types (El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 
2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Mohamad et al., 2008), while other 
studies find that Islamic banks are significantly more efficient than conventional banks (Al-
Jarrah and Molyneux, 2006; Al-Muharrami, 2008; Olson and Zoubi, 2008). But there is also 
evidence (including the most recent studies) that Islamic banks are significantly less efficient 
than conventional ones (Abdul-Majid et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2010; Kamarudin et al., 2014; 
Mobarek and Kalonov, 2014). These conflicting findings are in part attributed to the sample 
selection deficiencies that studies in this field suffer from. In particular, in an attempt to boost 
the sample size, a customary practice is to feature a number of disparate countries, where 
banks can be expected to face different economic conditions, banking and accounting 
regulations, as well as practices. 
Banking efficiency studies that undertake a second stage analysis indicate that efficiency per 
se is an important aspect alongside other bank characteristics such as size, composition of 
                                                            
3 More research is required in the link between liquidity creation and real economic activity; the limited 
evidence suggest a positive link between liquidity creation and GDP/capita (Berger and Sedunov, 2017). 
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assets, risk, liquidity and market structure/macroeconomic variables that affect banking 
performance (Beck et al., 2013; Berger and Mester, 1997; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; 
Hasan and Dridi, 2011; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009; Miller and Noulas, 1997; 
Staikouras et al., 2008; Yudistira, 2004). 
Measuring efficiency convergence typically employs two approaches: the 𝛽- and 𝜎-
convergence models borrowed from the growth literature (Sala-i-Martin, 1996) and the 
dynamic factor models (Kose et al., 2012; Phillips and Sul, 2009, 2007). A key hypothesis is 
that increasing global financial integration has led to banking efficiency convergence in a 
world-wide setting and there is plenty of evidence in support of such convergence across time 
(Andrieş and Căpraru, 2014; Fung, 2006; Gallizo et al., 2016; Kasman and Kasman, 2013; 
Mamatzakis et al., 2008; Rughoo and Sarantis, 2014; Weill, 2009; Zhang and Matthews, 
2012). 
In the context of Islamic and conventional bank efficiency convergence little research has 
been done, even though this is a well-researched topic within the EU and US. In particular, 
little interest has been shown in the steady state values that are derived from efficiency 
estimation models. One exception (Fung, 2006) highlights that bank efficiency convergence 
of US bank holding companies is conditional upon their initial differences in X-efficiency. 
The relatively few studies devoted to Islamic banking do not deal with efficiency 
convergence. Yet, convergence becomes increasingly important as Olson and Zoubi (2017) 
find that the two banking systems converge in terms of profitability, but not in terms of risk. 
As Islamic banks work alongside conventional banks there is every reason to expect 
comparable efficiency convergence dynamics between the two bank types. This is worth 
investigating as a similar pattern would indicate that the two business models are closely 
related despite of being argued otherwise elsewhere (Khan, 2010). Different conversion 
patterns confirm the existence evidence that two entities are indeed different. These are the 
gaps in the literature which we aim to fill. 
2.2. Theoretical framework 
The dynamics of efficiency are particularly important in the context of competitive 
advantage. Based upon resource-based theory (Chen et al., 2015) relative profitability 
performance correlates with differences in efficiency (Demsetz, 1973; McGahan and Porter, 
1999). Such efficiency differences might arise from differences in technology, experience or 
the business model. If efficient production techniques can be imitated by rivals, efficiency 
differences should not persist. Where differences do persist, this might indicate an inability to 
identify (or an unwillingness to copy) the operations of rivals. The terminology is “uncertain 
imitability” (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). 
The pivotal role of efficiency in banking has been well-documented in studies examining the 
interlinks between capitalisation, bank risk and competition (Altunbaş et al., 2001; Dong et 
al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Gonzalez, 2009; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Schaeck and 
Cihák, 2014). Recent studies show a negative relationship between competition and bank 
stability (Anginer et al., 2014; Goetz, 2018). Given the association between low values of 
efficiency and higher bank risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997), 
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competition incites banks to increase efficiency, strengthen performance and survive. Indeed, 
the role of efficiency may be catalytic (Beck et al., 2013a; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014). The 
speed of convergence in the presence of efficiency differences could be taken as a signal of 
competitive advantage; with slow convergence, competitive advantage is maintained for 
longer. In an ideal world, any bank would optimise its business model to attain long-run 
efficiency. Several factors (relating to economic conditions, operation and regulatory 
frameworks) may impede this process, and therefore affect both the convergence rate and the 
level of long-run efficiency of the bank. Differences in convergence rates (as well as the 
steady state efficiency levels) might arise because business practices, objectives and 
underlying principles differ. 
There is no clear theory underlying the similarities/differences between the convergence rates 
of Islamic banks to their conventional counterparts. But these may be expected between the 
two bank types for a number of reasons. 
First, there may be differences between the theoretically envisaged Islamic banking model 
and what is observed in reality. For instance, the cornerstone of Islamic banking is equity 
finance (El-Hawary and Grais, 2003), with profits and losses shared between the contracted 
parties according to some pre-determined ratio (Usmani, 2004). Yet, equity financing may 
constitute a small percentage of a typical Islamic bank’s asset portfolio (El-Gamal, 2006; 
Khan, 2010; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002). Instead, fee-based financial products are the 
norm, where an “implicit” interest rate is charged that is often highly correlated with the 
“explicit” interest rate observed in the conventional banking sector (Hussan and Masih, 
2014). 
Second, the extent of compliance with Islamic principles tends to vary by bank size, product 
offerings and demographics. Products, such as Islamic microfinance, are more common in the 
Far East, whereas real estate finance is more dominant in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) region. Therefore, differences in steady state efficiency and efficiency convergence 
rates might be expected within the Islamic banking sector; hence blurring distinctions 
between Islamic and conventional banks.  
Third, over time we would expect financial integration to increase worldwide through 
common regulatory frameworks (such as the Basel Accord),4 trade and monetary unions (for 
example the European Union) and an ever-increasing global banking presence (HSBC, for 
example, has branches in 80 countries). Thereby efficiency is more likely to become 
prominent on banks’ agenda and convergence is expected to take place (Fiordelisi et al., 
2011). 
Fourth, regulation and supervision of Islamic banking remains challenging at an international 
level. For example, regulators need to incorporate the peculiarities of Islamic banking, most 
notably with respect to capitalisation and liquidity management, into their operations, while 
ensuring a level playing field between Islamic and conventional banking (Song and 
Oosthuizen, 2014). Some countries document important improvements at this front but 
                                                            
4 Delis et al., (2011) highlights the contribution of such international organisations to the financial development 
of transitional economies. 
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Islamic banking expands to new countries, each with unique peculiarities. Hence, cross-
country differences with respect to accounting standards, regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks, licensing requirements and Shariah board authority impedes standardisation 
further contributing to the efficiency gap.  
Fifth, unique aspects of the Islamic business model could affect the efficiency gap and its 
dynamics. The Islamic banking model allows risk to “pass-through” from the asset to the 
liability side, thereby limiting the impact of adverse shocks on their solvency (Beck et al., 
2013b). Islamic financial products require the management of an inventory of assets (e.g., 
real estate, commodities), a task of increased complexity, known to impact efficiency (Ariss, 
2010; Beck et al., 2013b). Shariah restrictions can increase asset concentration amidst limited 
hedging and risk management capabilities (Elnahass et al., 2014; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016). 
Islamic banks may have limited course of action with regards to late payments and/or default 
(Baele et al., 2014; Song and Oosthuizen, 2014). The increased loyalty of religious clients 
may reduce pressure on Islamic banks to perform (Abedifar et al., 2013). 
In summary, both efficiency and the ability to swiftly revert to the steady-state (i.e., 
efficiency convergence), are important aspects to the Islamic banks long-term survival and/or 
expansion. 
 
3. Estimation framework - efficiency and convergence 
An implicit assumption underlying most efficiency studies is that all the banks under 
examination are fully synchronised. Yet, banks may face diverse – and react differently to – 
idiosyncratic and systemic shocks. Hence, they might be at different stages on their path 
towards equilibrium efficiency. To allow for this we generalise the assumption of 
homogenous response to shocks by first estimating the efficiency of our sample banks and 
then examining more closely their steady state and convergence patterns. We use three 
techniques that we detail below. 
3.1. Efficiency Estimation using an ODF 
Banking efficiency is typically measured using one of two approaches: a parametric frontier 
estimation, such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or a non-parametric frontier estimation, 
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Both approaches have been widely adopted within 
the banking context; see for example Ghroubi and Abaoub (2016), Jackson and Fethi (2000). 
In this study, we estimate the ODF using SFA, and apply a translog functional form as it is 
flexible, easy to estimate and permits the imposition of homogeneity (Coelli and Perelman, 
2000) – see Appendix 1 for technical details. Moreover, the SFA estimation allows for 
stochastic errors and considers the panel nature of our data. We estimate the ODF across all 
observations, i.e. across countries and across time periods as in for example Gallizo et al., 
(2016) and Mamatzakis et al., (2008). While it might be argued that different countries 
observed at different time periods face different production conditions, this is, in fact exactly 
what the convergence models in the second stage aim to capture. Making allowances for 
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these differences at this stage might conceal variations either in steady state efficiency or 
convergence rate, which might exist because of differences in environment or starting 
conditions. Moreover, we measure efficiency in a way so as to ensure a level playing field for 
both bank types. Therefore, we use a production function approach as in Casu and Girardone 
(2010) in preference to a cost or profit function because Islamic banks may not focus entirely 
on cost-minimization or profit-maximization. Given that the similarities between the Islamic 
and conventional banking practices can be both country and time specific, we opt to measure 
efficiency using an ODF that makes no specific assumptions about optimizing behaviour. A 
single ODF across all types of banks may be justified on the grounds that there is increasing 
competition between Islamic and conventional banks as evidenced by, for example, 
conventional banks establishing Islamic subsidiaries and/or Islamic windows, the availability 
of Islamic financial products and banks in non-Islamic countries, and the targeting of some 
Islamic products at all types of customers (Warde, 2000). 
The choice of variables qualifying for the distance function is guided by the previous 
literature (Abdul-Majid et al., 2011a, 2010; Casu et al., 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2004) and 
data availability. We follow the popular intermediation approach; see for example, Pasiouras 
(2008). For the choice of inputs and outputs we follow Johnes et al., (2014), using: i) deposits 
and short term funding 𝑥 , ii) fixed assets 𝑥 , iii) general and administration expenses 
𝑥  and iv) equity 𝑥  as inputs to produce: i) total loans 𝑦  and ii) other earning assets 
𝑦 . The justification for including these variables in the distance function model is 
explained in greater detail in Johnes et al., (2014). All monetary variables have been 
converted to real values using the GDP deflator. 
Our efficiency model provides a measure of gross efficiency and makes no distinction 
between conventional or Islamic banks. Underlying structural differences between the two 
sectors which might affect steady state efficiency are addressed in the convergence model. 
3.2. Modelling steady state efficiency and convergence 
We utilise the concepts of 𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence models (Young et al., 2008) to explore 
differences in steady state efficiency and efficiency convergence across the two bank types 
over the sample period. The convergence models used here and in other studies of banking 
efficiency convergence, see for example Weill (2009) and Casu and Girardone (2010), are 
adapted from the growth literature (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). The basic 𝛽-convergence model is: 
 ln 𝑢 , ln 𝑢 , 𝛼 𝛽ln 𝑢 , 𝜀 ,  (1)  
where 𝑢 ,  is the measure of efficiency of bank 𝑖 in time period 𝑡. The value of the parameter 
𝛽 represents convergence (if 𝛽 0) or divergence (if 𝛽 0) in banking efficiency. The 
larger is |𝛽| the greater is the speed of convergence or divergence. However the 𝛽-coefficient 
can be negative because of data measurement errors and random shocks rather than because 
of genuine convergence (Fung, 2006). To ensure that the 𝛽-coefficient signifies real 
convergence (rather than reversion towards the mean) it must coincide with significant 𝜎-
convergence (Fung, 2006) which is a measure of convergence based on the dispersion of a 
bank’s efficiency around the sector average in a given time period. We therefore estimate 𝜎-
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convergence in order to validate our 𝛽-convergence measures are valid. The basic 𝜎-
convergence model is given by: 
 ∆𝑤 , 𝛾 𝜎𝑤 , 𝜀 ,  (2)  
where 𝑤 , ln 𝑢 , ln 𝑢  and ∆𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤 , . Note that the value of the 
parameter 𝜎 can be interpreted in a similar manner to the value of 𝛽. 
We estimate a conditional 𝛽-convergence model whereby specific banks (Islamic or 
conventional) are permitted to have both different steady state efficiency levels and rates of 
convergence. For robustness, we use a variety of estimation methods including OLS, random 
effects and system-GMM. We implement a two-step system GMM approach, in line with the 
empirical applications of Mollah and Zaman (2015) and Casu and Girardone (2010), while 
following the theoretical underpinnings of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and Roodman (2006). As an additional robustness check we allow the value of both 𝛼 
and 𝛽 to vary for each bank in the sample by using a random parameter method of estimation 
(Swamy, 1970) for equation (1). These estimation methods address the issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity to differing extents. In particular, the RPM generalises the 
efficiency convergence framework by allowing each bank to have its own unique 
convergence dynamics. It is, therefore, better suited to cater for heterogeneous bank samples. 
This is particularly relevant for the Islamic banks as there are important differences within 
their sector with regards to bank size, age, financial product focus and Shariah board 
compliance. More details on models and methods are provided in Appendix 2. 
3.3. Classification trees 
A difficulty in cross-country analysis is to identify precisely the impact of bank type, country 
specific characteristics and regulation upon the quantity of interest (e.g., efficiency steady 
state or convergence rate). Traditional estimation methods often pose restrictions, due to the 
degrees of freedom limitations, when examining differences in the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 (see 
equation 1) by country and type. We therefore use a non-parametric classification tree 
methodology (see Appendix 3) to identify groups of banking sectors (by country) with 
similar steady state (𝛼) or convergence (𝛽) characteristics. The classification tree method has 
previously been used in a banking efficiency setting Emrouznejad and Anouze (2010), but 
has not been applied in the context of steady state efficiency or efficiency convergence. 
We apply the classification tree algorithm to the convergence rate (𝛽) and steady state 
efficiency (𝛼) estimates based on the RPM to examine whether there are groups of banks 
identified that share similarities with respect to efficiency dynamics. Here, we assume that 
any differences shall conform to the ex-ante Islamic/conventional split for every country. 
Classification trees can handle various types of control variables (i.e. continuous, categorical 
and binary), although the dependent variable must be binary.5 A 𝛽-convergence binary 
variable is constructed for the full sample and classifies banks into high/low 𝛽-convergence 
                                                            
5 Note that regression trees, in contrast, can handle continuous dependent variables at the expense of more 
complicated tree structures. 
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estimates according to a median split. In a similar manner, a steady state binary variable 
based on 𝛼 estimated using the RPM is constructed. Our control variables are the bank type 
(Islamic or conventional) and the country indicator. 
4. Data 
The data are drawn predominantly from the balance sheets and income statements of the 
Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database for the period 1999 to 2014 and across 23 countries. 
The countries are: Bangladesh, Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Malaysia, Oman, Philippines, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Singapore, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. A small number of 
observations for missing periods were obtained from the annual reports of individual banks. 
We finally derive an unbalanced panel of 4,864 bank-year observations for Islamic and 
conventional banks, with the number of banks ranging from 158 in 1999 to 502 in 2014. Of 
this total of bank-year observations, 1,089 relate to Islamic banks and 3,775 relate to 
conventional banks. There is clearly a large difference between the number of Islamic and 
conventional banks. While nearly 25% of our observations relate to Islamic banks this is 
similar or higher than in previous studies (Abdul-Majid et al., 2010; Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 
2005; Beck et al., 2013b; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Srairi, 2010). In line with Beck et al., 
(2013), we have winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 1 presents the distribution of 
bank observations by operational mode and country. Every country has at least one bank of 
each type over the time period covered. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 displays the mean values of the inputs and outputs of the ODF by bank type (panel a) 
and the number of bank observations by type and country (panel b). While Islamic banks are 
typically smaller than conventional banks in terms of deposits, loans and other earning assets, 
they are remarkably similar in terms of administrative expenses and are larger in terms of 
fixed assets. The relatively large mean administrative expenses for Islamic banks is reflective 
of the extra costs related to the Shariah board; while the high value of mean fixed assets 
follows the collateral requirements of many Islamic banking products; hence banks would 
typically have tangible assets (e.g., buildings, commodities) at their disposal for such use. 
Table 2 here 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Parametric estimation of efficiency using an ODF 
Figure 1 presents the efficiency scores derived from the first stage stochastic ODF,6 from 
which it appears that conventional banks have a higher efficiency than Islamic banks (Abdul-
Majid et al., 2011a, 2010; Johnes et al., 2014; Srairi, 2010). This difference is significant at 
the 10% significance level for the sample as a whole and for all individual years apart from 
2011. Whether these efficiency differences between Islamic and conventional banks at given 
                                                            
6 The estimated parameters of this distance function are available on request. 
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points in time represent a difference in long term or steady state efficiency will be 
investigated in the second stage convergence analysis.  
Figure 1 here 
5.2. Steady state efficiency and efficiency convergence 
a) OLS, random effects and system-GMM estimation 
Table 3 reports parameter estimates of absolute and conditional 𝛽-convergence models using, 
respectively, OLS, random effects (RE) and system-GMM estimation methods.7 The 
parameter estimates are similar across all estimation methods. The significance of the 𝜎 
coefficient in the associated 𝜎-convergence model (see Appendix 4 for full 𝜎-convergence 
results) confirms that the estimates of 𝛽-convergence in these models can be considered to be 
genuine, rather than reversion to the mean; see also Casu and Girardone (2010).  
Table 3 here 
A first inspection of the estimated parameters of models in columns I, IV and VII provide 
interesting reading. The (exponentiated) estimated intercepts suggest that all banks are 
converging at a steady state efficiency value of around 0.92 to 0.95, depending on estimation 
method. While there is no obvious link between steady state efficiency and financial 
development (as proxied by stock market capitalisation), the three countries with the 
markedly lowest steady state efficiency in the sample (see Figure 2), namely Syria, Brunei 
and Mauritania with a 3.85% average percentage point difference to Egypt, do not feature a 
stock market. The estimated 𝛽 coefficient ranges between -0.283 and -0.442 and is 
comparable with estimates reported in previous studies using EU and US banking data, 
suggesting comparable efficiency convergence dynamics in the banking systems of our 
sampled countries. 
Figure 2 here 
The slope and intercept dummies for bank type show no statistical significance across all 
models (columns II, V and VIII). The same conclusion is reached when country intercept and 
slope effects and time intercept effects are considered (columns III, VI and IX). The result 
suggests that Islamic and conventional banks are not different in terms of long-term (steady 
state) efficiency and convergence (to the steady state) rates. This suggests a close alignment 
of the two bank types, which may be in part attributed to Islamic banks offering products that 
are closely aligned to those of the conventional. This could be driven by similarities in the 
financial products required by the clientele of either bank type. There is also the need to 
comply with international accounting standards, banking regulation frameworks and product 
offering (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). This finding offers an affirmation to the 
literature contradicting any differences between the two bank types (see also section 2). 
Therefore, any differences in efficiency observed in the first stage (figure 1) of the analysis, 
                                                            
7 Note that the system-GMM estimations satisfy the conditions that there is significant AR(1) serial correlation, 
no AR(2) serial correlation and high Sargan/Hansen test (Casu and Girardone, 2010). 
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and which are also echoed in a substantial part of the literature, are merely short-term, 
transitory ones. 
Figure 3 presents the steady state efficiencies over time. The countries in the sample have 
been through several instances of financial distress and instability, most notably the late 
1990s Far East Crisis, the 2003 Iraq War, the 2005 crash of the Saudi Arabian stock market, 
and the 2008 global financial crisis. The patterns suggest that such events are negatively 
associated with steady state efficiency. 
Figure 3 here 
b) RPM estimation 
Table 4 presents the average estimated coefficients of the RPM model (see equation A2.2) 
and figure 4 presents their kernel densities by bank type. The average steady state efficiency 
is 0.90 with no significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks. Likewise, the 
average convergence rate is -0.554, again with no significant difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks. These (average) results are in line with those of the alternative estimation 
methods reported in table 3. Thus, once the individual circumstances of each bank are 
accounted for (i.e., each bank is permitted to have its own steady state efficiency and 
convergence rate) there appears to be no significant difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks either in terms of their steady state efficiency or the speed with which 
they converge to it. Our a priori clubs (Islamic and conventional) are thus far not confirmed 
empirically. 
However, the kernel densities suggest that the efficiency convergence dynamics of the two 
bank types may still be different, albeit country factors may be concealing such variations. 
Here, we want to elaborate on this rather crucial point. Suppose that the average efficiency 
steady state of conventional banks in our sample is 0.93. All the regression-based techniques 
we have deployed up to this point are valid for the average efficiency steady state of Islamic 
banks, while potentially allowing for country and time effects. However, such (parametric) 
techniques cannot allow for interactions between country, time effects and bank type due to 
the vanishing degrees of freedom. Therefore, these models are incapable to allow for the fact 
that in some countries Islamic banks may have a higher efficiency steady state than 
conventional banks while in others the opposite may be true. The RPM estimation offers a 
way to take this into account, but when the results are averaged, for reporting purposes as in 
table 4 for example, this information is lost. Instead, kernel density plots of the estimated 
parameters allow for the extraction of such information. Kernel densities by country are even 
better in this respect and show precisely that the Islamic banks are not always (i.e., in every 
country) inferior to conventional banks.8 
Therefore, before concluding that the two banking models are truly similar, we need to 
explore the possibility that country differences are concealing variations between the two 
bank types. The section below presents the results of the classification trees approach. 
                                                            
8 These kernel densities by country are available upon request. 
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Table 4 and Figure 4 here 
5.3 Classification trees 
Table 5 presents goodness-of-fit statistics for the classification trees, in line with those 
reported in Delen et al., (2013), Irimia-Dieguez et al., (2015), West (2000), namely accuracy, 
area under curve (AUC), expected misclassification cost (EMC), and pseudo R-squared (see 
also Appendix 3). These goodness-of-fit statistics show that the majority of the explanatory 
power comes from country factors, not the bank type. However, using both country and 
banking type information the classification works the best. 
Table 5 here 
Table 6 presents the clubs generated by the classification tree approach based on steady state 
(Panel A) and 𝛽-convergence according to bank type and country. The upper (lower) part of 
the table represents the high (low) steady state and 𝛽-convergence groups, respectively. Each 
panel lists the Islamic and conventional banking system of each country and the intersection 
region. It is the intersection region that provides the most interesting conclusion as it 
identifies those countries for which the two banking systems are similar. Figure 5 presents an 
optical illustration of Table 6 contents using Venn diagrams. 
Table 6 and Figure 5 here 
The classification tree results of Table 6 show clear evidence as to why the parametric 
approaches of the previous steps fail to identify any differences in steady state efficiency and 
convergence rate. Results vary by country, for instance in some countries, the Islamic banks 
are the ones exhibiting the highest speed of convergence; in other countries, it is the 
conventional ones. In addition, disparities in the initial conditions of banks in terms of 
economic and financial development of the country in which they are located, and the 
implementation of policies and reforms across countries, mean that banks operating therein 
may have different steady state efficiency levels as observed in panel A. In some countries, 
the two banking systems are indistinguishable from one another in terms of steady state 
efficiency and/or convergence speed; these lie in the intersection of areas in panels A and B 
of table 6 respectively. A few notable examples are discussed below. 
In Malaysia, the two bank types under investigation are indistinguishable in terms of the 
speed of the steady state efficiency and convergence. In contrast, banks in Jordan belong to 
different classifications, with conventional (Islamic) banks exhibiting low (high) steady state 
and high (low) convergence rate. This finding is driven by two reasons. First, in Malaysia, it 
is common practice for Islamic and conventional banks be part of a bank holding company, 
thereby sharing knowhow, experience and clientele. In contrast, Islamic banks in the Middle-
East cannot be part of a bank holding company owing to regulations that prohibits Islamic 
banks from sharing any ties with conventional financial institutions, hence expertise and 
other resources cannot be shared (Song and Oosthuizen, 2014). Furthermore, Islamic banks in 
Malaysia adopt financial instruments, whose Shariah conformity has been challenged in the 
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Middle-East and as a consequence these are not valid for use therein.9 This allows Malaysian 
banks to enhance their marketability and outreach of their Islamic Finance banks and related 
outlets. In contrast, the Middle-East (and particularly the GCC) comprises a dominant, 
concentrated, mainly domestic banking sector and traditional loan-taking/deposit-making 
activities constitute the bulk of operations there. As such, the banking portfolio of these 
countries features large exposures in real estate, infrastructure and household financing, while 
securities investments are limited (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). 
Pakistani Islamic banks belong to a low steady state/low convergence club, while the high 
steady state/ high convergence club is populated by the conventional banks. This apparent 
underperformance of Islamic banking may be linked to the history of this institution, with 
Pakistan being one of the (very) few countries that had opted in the past for a pure Islamic 
banking model, and which was subsequently abandoned due to implementation problems.10  
The above results highlight the usefulness of the classification trees in bringing out the 
differences in a composite financial system, where the efficiency dynamics of multiple 
banking systems are not always clear cut.11 The fact that there is no common equilibrium 
average efficiency level for Islamic and conventional banks across countries may give 
evidence of a dual-banking model (Zhang and Matthews, 2012). Conversely the existence of 
a common equilibrium average efficiency level for the two bank types may give evidence of 
a single banking model. In the latter case, the country would appear in the intersection of the 
graph. Drivers of this distinction, albeit latent, may be linked to country-specific 
characteristics, interpretations of the Islamic banking model and the degree of substitution 
between the two banking systems on behalf of its clientele. 
5.4 Bank type alignment, characteristics and economic indicators.  
One of our key findings in the previous section has been that the countries that lie within the 
intersection of figure 5 have the most aligned banking systems. This finding is interesting and 
merits closer investigation for several reasons. From a policy perspective, these banking 
systems are arguably less challenging as the two bank types may be viewed as sufficiently 
similar not to warrant different policy actions; one-size-fits-all type of policies should be 
most effective here. Policies, regulatory and supervisory practices of these systems may act 
as paradigms to other, particularly newer country-adopters of Islamic finance (Mejia et al., 
2014; Song and Oosthuizen, 2014); see Gelbard et al., (2014) for Islamic finance in Sub-
Saharan Africa challenges. By contrast, such policies in the countries outside of the 
                                                            
9 Certain financial instruments used in Malaysia, quite notably Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) that is utilised as a 
buy-sale property instrument, are not considered Shariah-compliant in the Middle-East. Additionally, the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia (SCM) has higher tolerances on the non-Shariah sources of income for 
Shariah-compliant firms (Usmani, 2004). 
10 During the 80s and 90s Pakistan was operating on a non-interest, Islamic banking model, which faced several 
implementation issues and was subsequently used in parallel to the conventional banking since 1999.  The other 
two countries being Sudan and Iran; Iran still operates a pure Islamic banking model, albeit it has recently 
allowed for conventional foreign bank branches to open in special economic free zones. 
11 Traditional techniques such as regression analysis would require a large number of degrees of freedom. 
Statistical significance tests are also not useful here given that they are either bivariate or require an a priori 
assumption on the banking system groupings.  
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intersection might contribute to the performance gap between the two bank types. As such 
and from an investor perspective, it is useful to know how the two banking systems compare 
in countries that fall within / outside the intersection. 
 
In this section, we seek to identify the salient features that characterise the banking systems 
that lie within the intersection. Table 7 compares background information on the financial 
structure, macroeconomic environment, market structure and bank specific information12 for 
those banking systems that lie inside the intersections of both graphs of figure 5 (steady state 
and convergence), and those that lie outside. We refer to the former as Fully Aligned (FA) 
and the latter as Not-Fully Aligned (NFA). 
 
Table 7 here 
 
An inspection of Table 7 suggests that there are significant differences between the two 
groups of banking systems, and these are primarily manifested within the financial structure, 
macroeconomic and market structure environment. The financial structure variables are 
suggestive of more pronounced differences with respect to financial depth than financial 
access. A comparison of the FA banking systems to the NFA ones finds the former to 
mobilise significantly more domestic credit to private sector, have a more developed 
insurance industry, while foreign banks are more active in loan generating/deposit taking 
business. The macroeconomic and market structure environment shows lower inflation rates, 
higher contribution from trade to GDP and a more concentrated banking system. Higher 
transparency, less bureaucracy and a more competent legal environment is evidenced in the 
FA group. The banks in the two groups are comparable in terms of profitability, but the ones 
in the FA group have higher financial stability (z-score), more diversified operations (Income 
diversity), and higher liquidity (Net Loans/Total Assets).         
 
In a subsequent step we estimate the following panel robust logit model.  
 
 𝑍 𝜇 𝜃𝛸 𝜁𝛭 𝜀  (3)  
 
where 𝛧 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for all banks in the FA group; zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables include bank-specific information (denoted as 𝑋) and 
macroeconomic, market structure and financial development indicators (denoted as 𝑀). 
Several models are estimated that allow for an increasing number of control variables and 
allow for fewer similarities between the two bank types. In particular, Model I allows for 
financial structure, macroeconomic and market structure variables, while Model II caters for 
bank-specific characteristics. Models III and IV capture the distinction between Islamic and 
conventional banks by allowing for interaction terms. We use a stepwise algorithm that 
maximises the goodness of fit. Table 8 presents these results. 
 
                                                            
12 Similar variables are used in Bertay et al.,( 2013).  
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Table 8 here 
 
A cursory inspection of the results suggests that country level variables (macroeconomic, 
market structure and financial development) have the largest explanatory power. This is 
verified by the fact that around 83% of the explanatory power of Model II comes from 
country level variables, and only the remaining is attributed to bank-specific factors. This is 
to be expected as such variables affect all the institutions in the country. The banking systems 
under the FA group have a significantly higher business disclosure index, suggesting that 
business practices are more transparent therein. Additionally, the financial depth in the FA 
group is also higher as verified by the positive and significant domestic credit to private 
sector and bank credit to bank deposits variables; thus warranting enhanced opportunities for 
company financing through higher financial development. On average, lower inflation rates 
characterise the FA group, corroborating further on the importance of a stable economic 
environment. Concentrated banking systems are more evident in the FA group, as verified by 
the positive and statistically significant Hirschman-Herfindahl indices. 
 
Bank-level characteristics are also important. In particular, the average bank in the FA group 
has a well-diversified source of income (Income Diversity), is typically smaller (Total 
Assets), more leveraged (Equity/Assets), more liquid (Net Loans/Total Assets), more 
profitable (Return on Equity) and are more financially stable (z-score) than the average bank 
of the NFA group. 
 
Compared to Models I and II respectively, Models III and IV show that the response of the 
two banking systems may deviate to similar changes in the underlying metrics. For example, 
a stable economic environment, proxied by lower inflation rates, tends to align the practices 
in Islamic and conventional banking systems; which manifests to a more homogenous 
financial system in that country. A similar conclusion is reached for financial depth. By 
contrast, alignment in the two banking systems is affected contrarily with respect to the 
Business Disclosure Index and the Legal Rights Index, potentially highlighting the different 
requirements of either bank type. Therefore, a country’s improvement with regards to these 
metrics needs to ensure a close alignment between these characteristics. Differentiated 
responses between the two bank types exist with respect to bank-specific characteristics too. 
For example, with respect to the average bank size. Large imbalances between banks 
constitute a challenge for a closely aligned financial system. This bank size effect is 
particularly relevant for Islamic banks as it affects business practices in complex ways. For 
example, large Islamic banks behave similarly to conventional banks (Abedifar et al., 2013), 
while the smaller of Islamic banks tend to perform better and bear less risk (Beck et al., 
2013b; Čihák and Hesse, 2010).  
 
6. Conclusion 
Measuring and comparing banking efficiency has received much attention, but few studies 
focus upon the dynamics of efficiency (steady state and convergence) and none compare 
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conventional and Islamic banks. In this paper, we compare and contrast estimates of steady 
state efficiencies and efficiency convergence rates of Islamic and conventional banks. With 
an extended dataset spanning a decade and a half (1999 to 2014) and covering 23 countries, 
we obtain estimates of bank efficiency scores using stochastic frontier analysis.  
To address steady state efficiency and efficiency convergence, we import the concept of 𝛽-
convergence from the growth literature. This is a familiar concept in the context of banking in 
economic unions. We obtain estimates of the convergence rate using OLS, random effects, 
system-GMM and random parameter model techniques, the last of which is a novel feature of 
this paper.  
Using the 𝛽-convergence model, our estimates using OLS, random effects and system-GMM 
finds no significant differences exist between the two bank types in terms of steady state 
efficiency and convergence efficiency. This result is confirmed when the random parameter 
estimation method is used.  
To identify clubs of countries and banking sectors with similar characteristics, we adopt a 
classification trees framework: a multi-dimensional separation procedure, which circumvents 
the vanishing degrees of freedom faced by parametric techniques. Classification trees show 
that the distinctiveness of Islamic and conventional banking (in terms of efficiency steady 
state and convergence) varies across countries. For example, in Malaysia we observe similar 
practice for the two bank types; but in Jordan the distinction is marked. 
To examine the drivers behind the alignment of the two banking systems, we use a panel logit 
estimation and a wide array of bank-specific, macroeconomic, market structure and financial 
development indicators. We find that the more financially aligned systems are characterised 
by financial depth, transparency in business, stability in the economic environment and 
concentrated banking systems. Individual banks operating within aligned banking systems 
have more diversified sources of income, higher liquidity, profitability and financial stability. 
Our research clearly identifies countries where the banking sectors are distinct (in terms of 
steady state efficiency and the speed with which banks converge to it) and those where they 
are similar. Thus, our findings inform the debate over the claim that Islamic banks generally 
mimic conventional banks. That similarities exist only in some countries suggests that 
behaviour may not be attributable to mimicking but to other factors such as regulatory / 
corporate, economic as well as bank-specific characteristics. Regulators and judicial 
authorities might be tasked to devise mechanisms and platforms that account for the identities 
of the two banking models. Future work should attempt to underpin our findings by looking 
into other factors such as demographic, educational, cultural, business, governance and 
financial screening practices.  
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Figure 2: Steady state efficiencies and convergence rates by country 
Notes: The figure is based on the results of column III in Table 3.
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Figure 3: Steady state efficiencies over time 
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Figure 4: Kernel density plots for convergence rate (𝜷) and steady state (𝜶) 



































Figure 5: Steady State and Convergence Rate Classifications 
 Panel A: Steady State Panel B: Convergence Rate 
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Notes: Classification based on the steady states as estimated from the random coefficients model. A transformation is applied to convert the continuous beta steady states into a 
binary variable denoting as 1 the High steady state banking systems (average value=-0.0597; average efficiency=0.942) and as 0 the Low steady state ones (average value=-
0.1506; average efficiency=0.860). The threshold for this separation is the median value here (-0.090; average efficiency=0.914).  Classification is based on 2 variables, Bank 
Type and Country Identifier. Classification based on the beta convergence rate as estimated from the random coefficients model. A transformation is applied to convert the 
continuous beta convergence rates into a binary variable denoting as 1 the Low convergence banking systems (average beta=-0.338) and as 0 the High convergence ones 
(average beta=-0.770). The threshold for this separation is the median value here (-0.530).  Classification is based on 2 variables, Bank Type and Country Identifier. 
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Table 1: Bank observations by types and country 
 All banks Conventional banks Islamic banks
Bahrain 213 118 95
Bangladesh 161 136 25
Brunei 18 16 2
Egypt 361 325 36
Indonesia 854 785 69
Iran 156 3 153
Jordan 187 151 36
Kuwait 145 65 80
Lebanon 409 394 15
Malaysia 195 127 68
Mauritania 93 76 17
Oman 92 88 4
Pakistan 153 99 54
Philippines 230 224 6
Qatar 119 84 35
Saudi Arabia 173 128 45
Singapore 111 103 8
Sudan 227 66 161
Syria 87 74 13
Tunisia 180 178 2
Turkey 311 282 29
United Arab Emirates 314 220 94
Yemen 75 33 42
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of ODF model variables. 
All banks Conventional banks Islamic banks 
Variable Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median 
Deposits and Short-Term Funding 𝑥  5,276 11,949 1,209 5,715 13,077 1,280 3,755 6,483 1,025 
Fixed Assets 𝑥  92 239 18 75 171 19 151 386 16 
General and Administration Expenses 𝑥   128 265 33 129 268 34 127 257 30 
Equity 𝑥  732 1,641 170 784 1,787 166 552 954 177 
Total Loans 𝑦  4,864 8,975 785 3,923 9,789 795 2,978 5,188 680 
Other Earning Assets 𝑦  2,331 5,666 471 2,667 6,295 524 1,168 2,071 344 
Note: Source Bankscope. All data have been adjusted to 2005 prices using the appropriate GDP deflator for each country. 
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Table 3: 𝜷-convergence model estimated using various estimation methods 


































































































No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year shift 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Country slope 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year slope 
dummies 
No No No No No No No No No 
𝒎𝟏 p-value       0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝒎𝟐 p-value       0.533 0.507 0.465 
Sargan/Hansen 
p-value 
      0.092 0.194 0.574 
R2 0.205 0.209 0.259 0.205 0.209 0.256    
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. OLS=ordinary least squares. TYPE takes the value 1 for Islamic banks and zero otherwise. 𝑁 = 4179 bank 
year observations for all models, and 𝑇 =15 years. Tests for first- and second order autocorrelation in the system-GMM model are denoted by m1 and m2, respectively. Sargan/Hansen is a test 
of the over-identifying restrictions relevant to the system-GMM model. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 




Table 4: RPM conditional 𝛽-convergence 
Model (7)   
 All Islamic Conventional p-value 
𝛽 -0.554 
(0.000) 
-0.525 -0.564 0.209 
𝛼 -0.105 
(0.000) 
-0.112 -0.102 0.175 




Notes: The table reports the average estimated coefficients for All banks, Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks, while the p-values are given in parentheses. The p-value column reports the 
results of the Wald tests for the equality of the convergence rates (β) and steady states (α) between 
Islamic and conventional banks.  
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Table 5: Classification Trees Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Dependent Variable Steady State Convergence Rate 
Accuracy (%) 65.10 62.40 51.60 64.90 61.90 52.80 
AUROC 0.703 0.681 0.514 0.711 0.654 0.533 
EMC 0.840 1.375 0.986 1.050 1.249 1.875 
Pseudo-R2 0.406 0.362 0.028 0.422 0.308 0.066 
       
Explanatory Variables       
Country  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Islamic Bank Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Notes: AUROC and EMC denote the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve and 
Expected Misclassification Cost respectively. 
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Table 6. Beta Convergence Rate and Steady State Classifications 
 Panel A: Steady State Panel B: Convergence Rate 




Indonesia Egypt UAE UAE Lebanon UAE 
Oman Lebanon Bangladesh Brunei Sudan Bahrain 
Pakistan Qatar Iran Egypt Yemen Bangladesh 
Philippines Sudan Jordan Oman  Brunei 
Tunisia  Kuwait Pakistan  Egypt 
Turkey   Philippines  Iran 
   Singapore  Jordan 
   Turkey  Kuwait 
     Qatar 
      




Bahrain Malaysia Bahrain Bahrain Malaysia Indonesia 
Bangladesh Mauritania Brunei Bangladesh Mauritania Oman 
Brunei Saudi Arabia Indonesia Indonesia Saudi Arabia Pakistan 
Iran* Singapore Oman Iran*  Philippines 
Jordan Syria Pakistan Jordan  Singapore 
Kuwait Yemen Philippines Kuwait  Syria 
UAE  Tunisia Qatar  Tunisia 
  Turkey Syria  Turkey 
   Tunisia   
Notes: Notes: Classification based on the steady state as estimated from the random coefficients model. A transformation is applied to convert the continuous beta steady states 
into a binary variable denoting as 1 the High steady state banking systems (average value=-0.0597; average efficiency=0.942) and as 0 the Low steady state ones (average value=-
0.1506; average efficiency=0.860). The threshold for this separation is the median value here (-0.090; average efficiency=0.914).  Classification is based on 2 variables, Bank 
Type and Country Identifier. Classification based on the beta convergence rate as estimated from the random coefficients model. A transformation is applied to convert the 
continuous beta convergence rates into a binary variable denoting as 1 the Low convergence banking systems (average beta=-0.338) and as 0 the High convergence ones (average 
beta=-0.770). The threshold for this separation is the median value here (-0.530).  Classification is based on 2 variables, Bank Type and Country Identifier. * Iran is typically 
considered an Islamic-banking country; however conventional banks are allowed to operate within specific free economic zones (Rooz Online, 2010; Presstv.com, 2010).  
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Table 7. Characteristics of banking systems. 
 Not-Fully Aligned Fully Aligned t-statistic 
Financial Structure: Access 
Account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+) 43.912 44.176 0.098 
Account used for business purposes (% age 15+) 7.178 6.621 0.873 
Account used to receive government payments (% age 15+) 14.325 5.129 6.472*** 
Account used to receive remittances (% age 15+) 7.637 5.964 2.800*** 
Account used to receive wages (% age 15+) 15.241 16.058 0.571 
Saved any money in the past year (% age 15+) 42.712 44.595 1.135 
Saved at a financial institution in the past year (% age 15+) 17.116 18.967 1.530 
Loan in the past year (% age 15+) 45.411 39.644 4.061*** 
Loan from a financial institution in the past year (% age 12.407 10.373 3.315*** 
Loan from a private lender in the past year (% age 15+) 5.177 5.178 0.002 
Loan from an employer in the past year (% age 15+) 4.782 5.990 2.842*** 
Loan through store credit in the past year (% age 15+) 13.645 15.370 1.694* 
Loan from family or friends in the past year (% age 15+) 31.180 28.705 2.157** 
Financial Structure: Depth 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 57.157 98.085 9.933*** 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) 40.807 64.958 8.045*** 
Syndicated loan average maturity (years) 6.998 7.388 1.876* 
Credit to government and state-owned enterprises / GDP 17.175 25.666 4.817*** 
Liquid liabilities / GDP (%) 57.192 109.386 10.929*** 
Bank deposits / GDP (%) 50.706 99.753 10.346*** 
Life Insurance Premium Volume / GDP (%) 0.614 1.150 4.759*** 
Non-Life Insurance Premium Volume / GDP (%) 0.718 0.913 4.532*** 
Loans from non-Resident Banks / GDP (%) 9.632 28.178 10.148*** 
Offshore Bank Deposits / Domestic Bank Deposits (%) 15.240 21.767 3.913*** 
Macroeconomic 
Trade (% of GDP) 86.307 105.008 2.740*** 
Inflation (%) 8.993 6.614 4.508*** 
Oil rents (% of GDP) 8.546 9.602 0.819 
GDP growth (%) 4.907 4.630 2.161** 
Market structure 
Business extent of disclosure index  6.603 7.095 1.539 
Strength of legal rights index  2.543 3.650 5.394*** 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index 0.191 0.308 8.678*** 
Hirschman-Herfindahl (Conventional sector) 0.213 0.387 10.586*** 
Hirschman-Herfindahl (Islamic sector) 0.398 0.436 1.829* 
Bank-specific 
Total Assets (ln) 9.092 9.131 0.154 
Equity / Total Assets 14.771 14.322 0.344 
Net Interest Revenue / Total Assets 3.694 2.734 3.197*** 
Other Operating Income / Total Assets 2.027 2.167 0.637 
Net Interest Margin 4.550 3.869 0.733 
ROA 1.341 1.261 0.306 
ROE 10.101 11.161 0.681 
Cost / Income 60.278 60.156 0.038 
Net Loans / Total Assets 51.499 39.805 6.152*** 
Liquid Assets / Customer Deposits and Short-Term Funding 41.597 47.396 1.460 
z - score 24.214 41.839 4.487*** 
Income diversity 0.357 0.553 2.583*** 
Notes: Fully Aligned (FA) refers to the banking systems that lie inside the intersections of both graphs of figure 5 (steady state and convergence), 
while Not-Fully Aligned (NFA) refers to those that lie outside. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Sources: 
Global Financial Development Database, authors’ calculations.
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Table 8. Panel logit estimation results.  
Models I II III IV 
Business extent of disclosure index  0.193*** 0.247*** 0.412*** 0.570*** 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.119) (0.133) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.122*** 0.143*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.039) (0.031) 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) -0.128*** -0.103** -0.141*** -0.135* 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.055) (0.071) 
Strength of legal rights index 0.229 -0.002 -0.758** -1.068*** 
 (0.270) (0.256) (0.385) (0.314) 
Bank credit to bank deposits (%) 0.029*** 0.055*** 0.0590** 0.099*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) 
Loan through store credit in the past year 0.282*** 0.290*** 0.528*** 0.622*** 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.171) (0.124) 
Income Diversity 1.102** 2.227*** 0.859 2.561* 
 (0.450) (0.635) (0.725) (1.335) 
Total Assets (ln)  -0.547***  -0.838*** 
  (0.177)  (0.196) 
Equity / Total Assets  -0.071***  -0.143*** 
  (0.024)  (0.039) 
Net Interest Margin  -0.006  0.052 
  (0.012)  (0.067) 
Return on Equity  0.026***  0.028 
  (0.010)  (0.023) 
Cost / Income  -0.007  -0.006 
  (0.007)  0.010) 
Net Loans / Total Assets  -0.048***  -0.058*** 
  (0.015)  (0.022) 
z - score  0.013***  0.026*** 
  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (CB) 5.977*** 6.059*** 9.143*** 9.150*** 
 (0.628) (0.876) (2.378) (1.255) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (IB) 11.91*** 10.07*** 15.48*** 14.40*** 
(3.188) (2.496) (4.468) (2.682) 
Business extent of disclosure index x IB   -1.129*** -1.254*** 
   (0.293) (0.304) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) x IB   0.0159 -0.0356 
    (0.019) (0.030) 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) x IB   -1.393*** -1.212*** 
    (0.513) (0.398) 
Strength of legal rights index x IB   0.588* 1.408*** 
   (0.342) (0.376) 
Bank credit to bank deposits (%) x IB   0.0714*** 0.048* 
   (0.021) (0.028) 
Loan through store credit in the past year x IB   0.558*** 0.292 
  (0.197) (0.192) 
Income Diversity x IB   1.812 1.988 
   (1.208) (1.764) 
Total Assets (ln) x IB    0.783*** 
    (0.297) 
Equity / Total Assets    0.074 
    (0.077) 
Net Interest Margin x IB    -0.039 
    (0.068) 
Return on Equity x IB    0.046 
    (0.052) 
Cost / Income x IB    0.024 
    (0.016) 
Net Loans / Total Assets x IB    -0.037 
    (0.035) 
z-score x IB    -0.008 
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    (0.015) 
Constant -18.45*** -13.88*** -30.06*** -26.51*** 
 (3.314) (2.677) (8.403) (5.338) 
F-statistic 421.22 184.51 63.34 158.99 
Pseudo R2 0.463 0.558 0.560 0.680 
Observations 435 435 435 435 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in brackets for the panel robust logit estimation of 
section 5.4 (Eq. 3). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix 1: The translog output distance function 
The translog output distance function is defined below for 𝑁 banks using inputs 𝑥  (k = 1,...,K) 
to produce outputs 𝑦   𝑚  1, . . . , 𝑀 : 
ln 𝐷 𝑥, 𝑦 𝛼 ∑ 𝛼 ln 𝑦 ∑ ∑ 𝛼 ln 𝑦 ln 𝑦 ∑ 𝛽 ln 𝑥
∑ ∑ 𝛽 ln 𝑥 ln 𝑥 ∑ ∑ 𝛿 ln 𝑥 ln 𝑦           𝑖 1,2, … , 𝑁 (A1.1) 
where subscript 𝑖𝑡 refers to bank 𝑖 in time period 𝑡. Distance function restrictions require the 
following conditions to hold: 
a) Homogeneity of degree +1 in outputs 
∑ 𝛼 1   and        (A1.2a) 
∑ 𝛼 0   𝑚 1,2, … , 𝑀   and      (A1.2b) 
∑ 𝛿 0   𝑘 1,2, … , 𝐾       (A1.2c) 
b) Symmetry 
𝛼 𝛼    𝑚, 𝑛 1,2, … , 𝑀   and      (A1.3a) 
𝛽 𝛽    𝑘, 𝑙 1,2, … , 𝐾       (A1.3b) 
By the homogeneity restriction 𝐷 𝑥, 𝜔𝑦 𝜔𝐷 𝑥, 𝑦  and so one output can be chosen 
arbitrarily, for example the 𝑀th output, such that 𝜔 1 𝑦⁄ . Thus equation (A1.1) can be 
written as: 
ln 𝑦
𝛼 ∑ 𝛼 ln ∑ ∑ 𝛼 ln ln ∑ 𝛽 ln 𝑥
∑ ∑ 𝛽 ln 𝑥 ln 𝑥 ∑ ∑ 𝛿 ln 𝑥 ln 𝜀           𝑖 1,2, … , 𝑁               
       (A1.4) 
where 𝜀 ln 𝐷 𝑥, 𝑦  
The quantity which is of interest here is the distance (or efficiency) ln 𝐷 𝑥, 𝑦  which is 
measured by the error term in equation (A1.4). We assume this error term can be split into two 
components i.e. 𝜀 𝑣 𝑢  where 𝑣  represents statistical noise, i.e.,  𝑣 ~𝑁 0, 𝜎 ,  and 
𝑢  represents the efficiency of bank 𝑖 in time period 𝑡 and is distributed as half-normal i.e. 
𝑢 ~𝑁 𝜇, 𝜎 , following (Aigner et al. 1977). 
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Appendix 2: Convergence model estimation 
The following conditional 𝛽-convergence model is estimated 
ln 𝑢 , ln 𝑢 ,
𝛼 𝛽ln 𝑢 , 𝛾TYPE , 𝛿TYPE ln 𝑢 , ∑ 𝜗 COUNTRY , , ∑ 𝜔 YEAR , 𝜀 ,
      (A2.1) 
TYPE is a binary variable with 1 denoting an Islamic bank, zero otherwise. Country dummies 
(COUNTRY) and year dummies (YEAR) are included to account for differences in financial 
regimes and technology across countries and time. 
If 𝛾  0 then Islamic and conventional banks are converging on different steady state 
efficiency levels; if 𝛿  0 then Islamic and conventional banks have different convergence 
rates.  
The convergence model presented above presupposes that differences between banks will 
depend solely on the business model (i.e. Islamic or conventional). Yet there may be some 
Islamic banks whose behaviour is more typical of conventional banks than of Islamic banks, 
and vice versa. In order to allow for differences between individual banks as revealed by the 
data (rather than as imposed by the analyst) the following β-convergence model is estimated 
using the random parameter model (RPM). 
ln 𝑢 , ln 𝑢 , 𝛼 𝛽 ln 𝑢 , 𝜀 ,      (A2.2) 
The estimated parameters (𝛼 , 𝛽 ) therefore allow each bank a) to have a different steady state 
efficiency and b) to react differently to its past efficiency level. In order to see whether there 
are differences between Islamic and conventional banks we subsequently examine the 𝛼  and 
𝛽  estimates for possible differences between the bank types. While a random parameter 
stochastic frontier approach has been applied to estimating bank efficiencies in the context of 
Mexico (Barros and Williams, 2013), the random parameter approach has not been applied in 
the context of banking efficiency convergence. 
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Appendix 3: Classification trees 
While no asymptotic theory exists, the virtue of the algorithm underpinning the classification 
trees methodology lies in its ability to reveal multidimensional data splits (Durlauf and 
Johnson, 1995). Classification trees can be seen as a type of variable selection procedure. The 
main difference is that in a stepwise regression the sample remains unchanged and the control 
variables are selected; in a classification tree the control variables are selected and the sample 
is allowed to vary. The classification trees procedure may be viewed as a union of piecewise 
linear functions, where observations are grouped according to the control variables. The splits 
are chosen with respect to minimising misclassification costs (Breiman et al. 1984). The 
essence of the algorithm is described here; for a full exposition of the classification tree 
algorithm see among others Breiman et al., (1984), Durlauf and Johnson (1995). 
Assume 𝑌 to be the variable of interest and 𝑋 , … , 𝑋  the control variables. The aim is to find a 
model for predicting 𝑌 from 𝑋 , … , 𝑋  through binary recursive splits. Starting from a club 
equivalent to the entire population of banking systems, say 𝑖 , 𝑖 , … , 𝑖  (this can be referred 
to as step 0) the algorithm searches for the best binary splits in the dataset.  
Step 1. For the data under investigation select a binary split, which is of the form 𝑥 𝑠 
versus 𝑥 𝑠. The choice of the binary split consists of two components, the selected control 
variable 𝑗  and the realisation of the control variable 𝑠 . The binary split creates two nodes 
that are subsequently tested for impurity. Impurity of a node is measured by the Gini’s 
Diversity Index (GDI).13 The GDI of a node is given as 1 ∑ 𝑝 𝑖  where the sum is over the 
clubs 𝑖 at the node and 𝑝 𝑖  is the observed fraction of clubs with club 𝑖 that populate the node. 
A pure node has only one club and a GDI equal to zero; otherwise positive values of GDI 
measure the degree of impurity in the node where more than one clubs are present. 
 Therefore, at each splitting level the following expression is minimised: 
𝛥 ℎ min min 1
𝑐
𝑐 𝑐
|𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 , min 1
𝑐
𝑐 𝑐
|𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 ,  
where the parameter ℎ denotes the splitting level with ℎ 1 denoting the first level that two 
nodes exist. The variables of interest to the algorithm 𝑗, 𝑠  split the realisations of the 𝑌 
variable (𝑐 ,𝑐 )  into two nodes 𝑅 ,  𝑅 .14 The lower the value of the quantity 1  the 
higher the purity level of the first node.     
Step 2. If one of the resulting nodes has zero impurity score then this is classified as a pure 
node and the branch is terminated here. Conversely, if one of the resulting nodes has a positive 
impurity score, then a further split may be possible.  
Step 3. For the impure nodes, continue from step 1. 
The algorithm finishes when the resulting nodes are either pure or cannot be broken down any 
further due to observation requirements. 
                                                            
13 For a full exposition of impurity metrics used in this context we direct you to (Berzal et al., 2003). 
14 For ease of exposition we assume that the predictor variables are categorical variables.  
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Accuracy is defined as the percentage of banking systems that are correctly predicted by the 
model as being of high/low convergence rate; see also (Delen et al., 2013).  
The area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUROC) curve is used to gauge the 
performance of a binary classifier system, such as classification trees. An AUROC curve that is 
convex to the diagonal indicates that the proposed model is better in distinguishing positive 
and negative ranks (or in our case high vs low convergence banking systems) than randomness 
would imply. Irimia-Dieguez et al., (2015) offer an application of the AUROC curve in 
classification trees, with Swets (2014) offering a more detailed analysis.   
Expected misclassification cost (EMC) is given as: 
𝐸𝑀𝐶 𝐶 𝜋 𝐹𝑃𝑅 𝐶 𝜋 𝐹𝑁𝑅 
where 𝐶  and 𝐶  are the relative costs of misclassification with 𝐶  representing the case 
where a low convergence banking system is classified as a high one and 𝐶  represents the case 
where a high convergence banking system is not classified as a high one; 𝜋 , 𝜋  are prior 
probabilities of high and low convergence banking systems; FPR and FNR denote the False-
Positive-Rate and False-Negative-Rate respectively. In terms of values, 𝐶  and 𝐶  are 
assumed equal to 1 and 5 respectively, in line with Irimia-Dieguez et al., (2015) and West 
(2000); 𝜋 , 𝜋  are equal to 0.5 by definition of the median-split we imposed, while FPR and 
FNR are estimated from the data. 
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Appendix 4: Estimated 𝝈-convergence models 
Table A4: 𝝈--convergence model estimated using various estimation methods 


































































































No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year shift 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Country slope 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year slope 
dummies 
No No No No No No No No No 
𝒎𝟏 p-value       0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝒎𝟐 p-value       0.553 0.528 0.421 
Sargan/Hansen 
p-value 
      0.044 0.632 0.743 
R2 0.203 0.203 0.252 0.203 0.203 0.252    
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. OLS=ordinary least squares. TYPE takes the value 1 for Islamic banks and zero otherwise. 𝑁 = 4179 bank 
year observations for all models, and 𝑇 =15 years. Tests for first- and second order autocorrelation in the system-GMM model are denoted by m1 and m2, respectively. Sargan/Hansen is a test 
of the over-identifying restrictions relevant to the system-GMM model. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
